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The constitutionalization of the tort of defamation has re-
sulted in some rather great inconsistencies in the law. The
state of today's defamation standard may be a result of the lack
of certainty and consistency with which the Supreme Court has
handed down defamation case rulings since the landmark deci-
sion in New York Times v. Sullivan.' The Supreme Court has
developed a defamation standard based more on geography and
psychology than on logic. In the future the Court will undoubt-
edly take up the question of a new national standard. The
Court may move toward a return to the common law, moving
away from a Constitution-based first amendment standard.
This article will review the Supreme Court's constitutional-
ization of defamation and will explore various considerations
that must be made in finding a better national standard for the
tort of defamation.
I
The Development of Constitutional Protection
for the Tort of Defamation
The law of libel did not encompass federal constitutional
guidelines until 1964 in the watershed decision of New York
Times v. Sullivan.? 2 In this historic decision, the Supreme
Court ruled for the first time that there are constitutional limi-
tations in the area of defamation. The Court was forced to
hand down the New York Times ruling because of the national
emergency arising from extreme resistance in the South to the
enforcement of long delayed civil rights. Despite the care with
* Born 1906; J.D., University of Chicago, 1930; Professor, John Marshall School
of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. I&
1033
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
which the opinion was crafted, it had elements of haste in it,
necessitating important changes from time to time as the Court
looked more penetratingly into the complexities of the subject.
The Court's position has accordingly shifted in various direc-
tions since New York Times, beginning with the two cases that
extended the constitutional protection of "actual malice"3 from
actions by public officials in their official activities to suits by
public figures generally. As initially interpreted, the tendency
in federal and state courts was to find plaintiffs as public in
character, no matter how unimportant they might appear to
the casual observer, and so subject plaintiffs to the requirement
that they prove "actual malice" with convincing clarity.
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided S Amant v. Thompson,5
which made the constitutional test for "actual malice" so sub-
jective as to be almost impossible to prove with the required
convincing clarity.
The net effect of these pioneering cases was to create the im-
pression that defamation cases were on the way out, at least as
far as public characters were concerned. These cases were de-
cided in the period of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and
Goldberg, who felt, in varying degrees, that liability for libel
was precluded by the absolutist terms of the first amendment.
Indeed, the Court seemed to go even further in narrowing the
scope of defamation and related actions when it decided Time,
Inc. v. Hill,6 in which it extended the New York Times actual
malice rule to invasion of privacy cases. The Court also ex-
tended the New York Times rule in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia 7 to all plaintiffs, rather than only those individuals in
the public eye, as earlier cases had done. A plurality of the
Court declared that the "actual malice" rule would apply even
for private individuals involved in matters of public or general
interest.8
It was clear that some of the individual justices were greatly
troubled by the situation, especially as concerned the issue of
punitive damages in this case, because so many of them wrote
3. "Actual malice" was defined in New York Times as "knowledge of falsehood
or reckless disregard of truth or falsity .... I& at 280.
4. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.
Walker, 418 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
5. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
6. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
7. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
8. Id at 43-44.
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separate opinions in Rosenbloom.9 Nevertheless, the lower
courts seemed to assume that such was the direction in which
the highest Court was going, and decisions reflecting that view-
point were published in almost every jurisdiction.10
This progression was unexpectedly and completely inter-
rupted in the landmark case in which I was the plaintiff, Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc."' In that case the Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled Rosenbloom and decided that private individ-
uals, even if involved in matters of public or general interest,
need not establish "actual malice" in order to recover for defa-
mation. The court held that it was sufficient for such individu-
als to prove fault and "actual injury" as defined by state law.
The Court indicated the difficulty in making ad hoc decisions
based upon a factual or judicial determination as to what was of
general or public interest. It was much easier, the majority
said, to classify plaintiffs as public or private persons, regard-
less of what was involved in the particular situation out of
which the case arose. The Court declared, moreover, that only
in special limited circumstances would individuals be regarded
as public figures. In Gertz, the Court devoted pages to retelling
the public aspects of my career and then concluded that I was,
nonetheless, a private person.
To show that it meant to decrease the possibility of plaintiffs
being regarded as public figures, the Court decided three cases
soon after Gertz in a manner that would not have been possible
after New York Times was decided. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,2
9. Justices Black and White concurred separately, while Harlan, Marshall and
Stewart dissented.
10. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 111. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
11. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
I have had the somewhat unusual opportunity to observe the law of libel in theory
and in operation from several contrasting perspectives, and this possibly entitles me
to express some views that may be useful, if unorthodox. As a litigant, I was the
successful plaintiff in the landmark Gertz case, which is now cited as often as any libel
case and is the subject of innumerable law review articles and is studied by every law
student. As a trial lawyer in defamation cases, I have often represented plaintiffs and
occasionally defendants. My cases include: Farnsworth v. Tribune, Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286,
253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Uines, 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217
(1968); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 586 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1978); Parmelee v.
Hearst Publishing, Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950). These cases have con-
cerned themselves with such vital issues as the extent to which truth is a constitu-
tional defense, conditional privilege, credit reports, and the innocent construction
rule. As a lawyer, I have represented authors (Henry Miller for one), publishers (a
university press, Grove Press and tabloid newspapers), movie producers (such as Russ
Meyer), and others concerned with possible liability.
12. 424 U.S. 448 (1973).
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Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,3 and Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,14 the Court found that each of the three plaintiffs
was a private person in circumstances in which two of the
plaintiffs would earlier have been considered to be public
figures and one a public official.'5
Case after case followed in virtually all of the states, applying
the Gertz rule.'6 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc.17 the Court seemed to backtrack from Gertz and the
many cases decided since then. While it was again only a plu-
rality decision, the principal opinion was written by Justice
Powell, the same justice who had written the majority opinion
in Gertz. Justice Powell declared that the Gertz ruling was con-
fined to individuals involved in matters of public or general in-
terest and for private persons involved in purely private
matters, here a credit report, the common law rules would ap-
ply and both actual and punitive damages could be recovered
without proving fault or actual malice.' 8 Again, Chief Justice
Burger' 9 and Justice White,' joining in the result, but not in
the reasoning, made it clear that they were more skeptical than
ever about both New York Times and Gertz, believing that both
of those cases ought to be reconsidered and possibly overruled.
Surprisingly, Justice Powell forgot or ignored what he had said
in Gertz as to the difficulty of making ad hoc determinations of
public or general issues. It may be argued that there is the
same difficulty in determining the status of individuals.
In the same time period, the Court decided several other
cases, continuing to modify the constitutional guidelines for
defamation. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 2 held that plain-
tiffs could choose the jurisdiction in which to sue even if this
13. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
14. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
15. It should be noted, however, that even in deciding Gertz, two members of the
Court, Chief Justice Burger and particularly Justice White, expressed skepticism
about a special rule for private persons. They preferred either the law as it then stood
or a more gradual development. Justice Blackmun went along with Justice Powell
only to create a majority. Justices Douglas and Brennan, holding to their first amend-
ment absolutist views, dissented completely. They would have upheld the dismissal of
my case, although Brennan agreed that I was a private person and not a public figure.
16. See generally, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER & KEE-
TON ON TORTS 805-812 (5th ed. 1984).
17. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
18. 1& at 753-55.
19. Id at 763-64 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).
20. I& at 765-73 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
21. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
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might enlarge their right to extend the statute of limitations
and revive an otherwise dead case. In Bose Corporation v. Con-
sumers Union2 the Court decided that every finding of "actual
malice" required an independent constitutional review. Fi-
nally, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps2 the Court decided
that the burden of proof as to falsity lay with the plaintiff, not
with the defendant as in common law.
II
The Localization of Constitutional Protection
From a glimpse of the above cases, it is clear that certainty
has gone out of the Court's rulings in this highly controverted
area of the law. The Court has also applied the first amend-
ment in such a way that a constitutional result in defamation
depends upon geography rather than upon general principles of
national application. The geographic fixation of the Court is
evidenced in the defamation cases following New York Times.
In Gertz, Justice Powell declared for the Court: "We hold that,
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuri-
ous to a private individual."' '
The rationale for the Court's approach stems from the com-
peting concerns of states' interests and the rights granted by
the first amendment. The Supreme Court has found that dif-
ferent first amendment interpretations are required so as to al-
low for diversity within states, while protecting speech from a
possible chilling effect on media defendants. 25
We must assume that the Court did not stumble into this bi-
zarre situation. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger expressly stated
his awareness of the less than clear-cut determination of cases
in the first amendment area. It could be said that the Court
was swayed more by psychology than by pure logic.
The majority of the Court, as well as, perhaps, the majority
of the American people, has an extreme distaste for cutting off
relief for those whose reputations have been grossly assaulted
22. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
23. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
24. Gertz, 418 U.S at 347-48.
25. I& at 342-45.
26. Id, at 354-55.
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by the media. It is easy in these circumstances to bend constitu-
tional interpretation to what is believed to be the greater good.
Generally, the Court resists and stands for basic federal consti-
tutional requirements, but we can understand, without approv-
ing, when it wanders from the required course when highly-
charged, emotional issues are involved.
I am not too much troubled by the diverse results in mone-
tary judgments that come from such a general standard, as long
as the standard survives. The very same individual with the
same cause of action, be it for loss of life or limb or for wronged
reputation, may achieve totally different results. In my own
case, the first trial resulted in a verdict of $50,000 and the sec-
ond trial in one of $400,000. The first verdict was set aside by
the trial court, and its ruling was affirmed by the Federal Ap-
pellate Court,27 but later overruled by the Supreme Court. The
second, far more substantial result was sustained from begin-
ning to end. The case is not unique within the defamation area.
Such variety is normal, and there is no constitutional principle
that can prevent such diversity.
It is only natural that the Court should use its broad constitu-
tional powers to give meaning and implementation to the vari-
ous provisions of the Constitution since the Constitution, and
particularly the Bill of Rights, is phrased so succinctly and is
lacking, for the most part, in specificity. Otherwise, the Consti-
tution would have little meaning and no life.2s However, it is a
different situation when the Court grants the states and local
communities the right to apply, in their own ways, the constitu-
tional guidelines with respect to defamation. This aberration
has caused the Court to make many changes with respect to
defamation law since its decision in New York Times.
It may be argued that the Court has gone too far in defining
the scope of defamation law. In the long run, we might be bet-
ter off if we remained content to rely upon the common law or
27. Robert Welch, Inc. v. Gertz, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
28. This is illustrated best, I think, in connection with the Court's rulings, under
the fourteenth amendment, in trying to bring about the desegregation of public
schools. The Court utilizes the wide scope of its equitable powers, inherent in all
judicial bodies, in order to frame decrees applicable to specific and often dissimilar
situations. Less broadly, but just as effectively, the Court has given viability to the
fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right
to counsel by fashioning the Miranda rule. When a provision is not self-enforcing or
crystal clear, the Court will give meaning somehow to it if the area is important
enough and the time is ripe for constitutional interpretation.
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such few statutes as might be enacted by the state legislatures.
The efforts of the Supreme Court have been rather imperfect,
requiring frequent modification, and leading one to ponder
whether a better, more consistent approach is possible.
III
A Reassessment of the Constitutionalization of
the Tort of Defamation
As the Court continues its deliberations in this area, particu-
larly with changes in the personnel of the Court, there will be
reexaminations of prior decisions, leading to further refine-
ments and possibly reversals. It appears doubtful at this time
that the Court will ultimately veer to an interpretation that al-
lows a national standard of fault for private persons who have
been defamed. Defamation most likely will not be treated like
personal injury torts that have a negligence standard for liabil-
ity. Although unlikely, it would not be impossible, however,
for the Court to swing back completely to the common law, or
at least something substantially different from the current law.
The media argue that the liberalization of the law, especially
a return to the common law, would chill the freedom of the
press and imperil publishers and broadcasters with the risk of
heavy verdicts and, in any event, excessive costs and fees in de-
fending actions. However, before the New York Times decision
was handed down in 1964, the media lived well as a "six percent
investment," in the words of William Allan White, without the
protection of that case and its progeny. If not for the special
circumstances in which the New York Times case arose - the
hysteria of the response in the South to the struggle for civil
rights - we might very well have continued to flourish with-
out any such decision. For generations prior to 1787, the com-
mon law had served everyone, including the media, well, and
with consistency.
All individuals and entities ought to guard themselves
against the consequences of causing injury through their own
negligence or through violating the rights of others. It is one of
the costs of existing and doing business in a crowded world fil-
led with sensitive people. An injury to reputation or an intru-
sion into one's privacy can be as harmful in some instances as
the loss of life or limb. By exercising due care and adhering to
1988] 1039
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standards of decency, such harm can be avoided or
circumscribed.
Let me again take my own case as an example. Those con-
nected with the writing, publication and distribution of the of-
fending article, in which I was defamed, did not bother to make
inquiry of me or of those having knowledge of me. They read
none of my numerous articles, reviews and books. They did not
even bother to look at the easily accessible references to me in
such standard works as Who's Who in America. They just
barged ahead, heedless of my rights, in the confidence that I
would have no redress because of their version of the freedom
of the press. For example, they charged me with being the ar-
chitect of a communist conspiracy to frame a police officer for
murder, seemingly oblivious that I had been director of public
relations of the Illinois Police Association. Since theirs was a
monthly publication, there was no necessity for haste or lack of
deliberation. Nor would due care have required excessive cost.
Many defamation cases are similar to mine, with the offend-
ing parties carelessly rushing in to publish falsehoods. If
human bodies were involved, as in the usual personal injury
tort, there would be no question as to the necessity on the de-
famer's part of proving due care and absence of negligence. I
suggest that the same care should be required in situations
where reputations are involved.
In every case involving the reputation of a professional per-
son, such as a lawyer, clergyman or physician, it is immediately
apparent that certain kinds of statements are inherently dan-
gerous and damaging and can result in the loss or diminution of
earnings, as well as loss of reputation, humiliation and embar-
rassment. There should be pause before publication, with at
least a minimum of inquiry and research. Constitutional guide-
lines should not preclude such requirements.
When publishers can rely completely upon built-in constitu-
tional protections, they will be indifferent to the rights of those
they may wrong. Only when they are held to accountability
will they exercise due care. One example stems from the days
when I was the lawyer for two tabloid publications. I examined
each proposed article in manuscript form before releasing it for
publication. I was on guard against defamation, invasions of
privacy, obscenity and other possible offenses. In that period,
these two publications were not sued. Yet, instead of profiting
from that experience, the editors decided that they would rely
[Vol. 10:10331040
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upon their own educated judgment without submitting the pro-
posed articles to me, indicating that they would consult me only
if they were sued. Thus, the degree of care that editors will
exercise is proportionate to the degree of safety they feel in
publication. They may act considerably more recklessly if they
feel that built-in constitutional protections shield them from
liability.
A. Things Better Left Unchanged
Assuming a general return to the common law, certain pro-
tections would be likely to remain. As the Court stated in
Gertz, mere opinions are not actionable, no matter how cruel or
obnoxious.' It is only allegations of fact that can give rise to an
action for defamation. Of course, the line between opinion and
fact is often obscure and might require a judicial determination
or even a jury finding. For the same reason, fair comment
would continue to be protected in the circumstances heretofore
defined by the courts.
Certain state laws should remain in effect. There are also
many jurisdictional and procedural issues that should continue
to be matters of determination by constitutional fiat. Consider,
for example, the statute of limitations, discovery, and trial pro-
cedure. The movement for uniform state laws, so successful in
the past in other situations,' should be encouraged in the law
of defamation, rather than preempted.
Punitive damages are also scarcely a matter for constitu-
tional determination by the Supreme Court. Trial judges are
best qualified to grant remittiturs or new trials and, in the first
instance, to give proper instructions as to damages. It is clear,
too, that if the offense is sufficiently heinous, juries or judges
will be able to disguise the award of punitive damages as com-
pensatory damages. The line between the two is not always
sharp and clear.
In any event, what is so bad about punitive damages in proper
cases? Elsewhere in the law, punitive damages are allowed
where there is the necessity to punish or discourage certain
kinds of offensive conduct." Like other potential losses, those
involved in defamation can often be covered by the appropriate
29. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
30. See, e.g., the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in most states.
31. See general, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, upra note 16, at 14-15.
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kind of insurance, most probably a legitimate cost of doing busi-
ness, and deductible on tax returns.
B. The Use of Categorical Distinctions
While one might contrast the New York Times with the Na-
tional Enquirer, pointing out that the former upholds the high-
est standards of journalism and the later exemplifies what is
dubious and meretricious, there is, however, a Gresham's Law
in journalism - the bad tends to drive out the good, or at least
to degrade it. One has only to observe the nature of what is
published in every kind of newspaper and magazine to under-
stand that differentiations are only in degree. Therefore, we
have the same standards of liability for all, heedless of the en-
suing corruption.
Is it reasonable to advocate different rules, dependent on the
nature of the newspaper, magazine or book? Should all news-
papers, for example, be held to the standard of the best publica-
tion in each community? At the heart of Justice Powell's
plurality opinion in Dun and Bradstreet 2 is the question as to
whether there are varying degrees of entitlement to first
amendment protections. The answer to this question might en-
able us to differentiate between the New York Times and the
National Enquirer.
Such content-based restrictions, however, like geographical
distinctions, may lead to much variance in the law by failing to
provide a concise definition of what is to be protected under the
first amendment. Thus, as the Court searches for consistency,
it must avoid such categorical differentiations.33
32. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
33. One can best visualize and sum up the intricacies and complexities of the con-
stitutional guidelines with respect to defamation when one views them in summary
form. Here is an attempt at it:
I. Status of Plaintiffs and Defendants
A. Public Officials, public figures, private persons
B. Media or non-media
C. Corporations or other legal entities
II. Nature of Offending Material
A. Factual material or opinions
B. Fiction, parody, poetic license
C. Private material
D. Material of general or public interest
III. Privileges
A. Absolute or limited privileges




The many variations and complexities of constitutional defa-
mation law allows one to tolerate the difficulties the Supreme
Court is having in finally setting the law to rest. The present
phase of the law began with New York Times, which revolved
around great human struggles. It may be that a somewhat simi-
lar struggle will be required in order for the Court to have a
flash of illumination, resulting in exactly the right constitu-
tional guidelines, at least for a season.
C. Congressional and executive privileges
D. Fair comment
E. Governmental documents and proceedings and judicial proceedings
F. Shield laws
G. Truth or falsity
H. Right of reply statute
I. Innocent construction rule





C. Actual malice and constitutional review
D. Punitive
E. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
F. Roles of courts and juries
G. Means of reducing damages, such as retraction
V. Place of Suit and its Consequences
A. What determines where suit can be filed and the right of plaintiffs to choose
B. Long arm statutes
C. Extension of statute of limitation by reason of jurisdiction chosen
D. Procedural consequences
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